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FOREWORD: THE WAY TO CARNEGIE 
Sharon L. Beckman* 
Paul R. Tremblay** 
Introduction 
 Law schools have a clear mission, one would think. Even if the 
American Bar Association did not insist upon it, any given law school 
would acknowledge its commitment to “prepare[] its students for ad-
mission to the bar, and effective and responsible participation in the 
legal profession.”1 In return for a substantial contribution of (usually 
borrowed) money, law schools promise to train students to practice law 
as competent, thoughtful, and faithful fiduciaries for their clients and 
to seek a just and fair system. 
 Though law schools’ collective mission is apparent, the question of 
how best to implement that mission has perplexed the legal academy 
for decades and continues to do so. How might law schools best train 
their students to practice effectively? After an early period where law-
yers developed skills through an apprenticeship experience, law schools 
attempted to teach law as a social science using appellate cases as its 
data, following the leadership of Christopher Columbus Langdell.2 The 
aim was to train law students rigorously to “think like lawyers,” and es-
 
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic, 
Boston College Law School. 
** Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. 
1 Standards and Rules of Procedures for Approval of Law Schools, § 301(a) 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/ 
legal_education/Standards/2011_2012_aba_standards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf. 
2 See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 
34 UCLA L. Rev. 577, 581 (1987). Langdell professed that “[l]aw, considered as a science, 
consists of certain principles or doctrines.” C. C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the 
Law of Contracts, at vi (1871); see also Spiegel, supra, at 581 (quoting Langdell, supra at 
vi). Langdell elaborated in a speech: “[L]aw is a science, and . . . all the available materials 
of that science are contained in printed books . . . . [The library] is to us all that the labo-
ratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history 
to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.” The Harvard Law Sch., Harvard 
Celebration Speeches, 3 L.Q. Rev. 118, 124 (1887) (reprinting speeches delivered by Justice 
Holmes and Professor Langdell at Harvard University’s quarter-millennial celebration); see 
also Spiegel, supra, at 582 (quoting the same speech). 
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pecially to develop the analytic tools necessary to work expertly with 
law’s complexity.3 
 The challenge to the Langdellian case method is that, while effec-
tive in inculcating rigorous habits of reading and understanding legal 
principles, it elides a substantial component of the lawyer’s important 
work. Critics have long noted that the “science” devised by Langdell 
does not really teach students to think like lawyers, but more likely to 
“think like appellate judges,” or to “think like law professors.”4 The case 
method misses a great deal of the practice of law by neglecting clients, 
the role of fact development and ambiguity, the importance of judg-
ment and reflection, and the ethical underpinnings of serving others in 
a professional role. It erases the context of practice and, in doing so, 
fails to teach students to recognize and take account of the social, eco-
nomic, and political forces constraining the choices of others.5 Observ-
ers have recognized this weakness of traditional legal education for 
decades. The Legal Realists urged law schools to address the street-level 
experience of law practice in the 1920s and 1930s.6 A succession of re-
ports on legal education since then—including the Reed Report (also 
known as the first Carnegie Report) in 1921, the MacCrate Report in 1992, 
Best Practices for Legal Education in 2007, and the more recent Carnegie 
Report in 2007—each emphasized the need for greater attention to the 
practice experience of lawyers within legal education, the development 
of reflective judgment, and an exploration of the moral experience of 
lawyering.7 
                                                                                                                      
 
3 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 35, 37 (1950) (noting the 
aim to teach legal thinking without accepting it); Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like A 
Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 13 (2007); Michelle M. 
Harner, The Value of “Thinking Like a Lawyer,” 70 Md. L. Rev. 390, 392 (2011); Mary Kate 
Kearney & Mary Beth Beasley, Teaching Students How to “Think Like Lawyers”: Integrating 
Socratic Method with the Writing Process, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 885, 897 (1991) (describing how to 
develop analytical skills through legal writing courses). 
4 Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1063, 1087 (1986); Roy T. 
Stuckey, Education for the Practice of Law: The Times They Are A-Changin’, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 648, 
668 (1996); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st-Century Perspec-
tive, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 613–14 (1984). 
5 See Byse, supra note 4, at 1087; Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 907, 910–11 (1933); K. N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Edu-
cation, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 651, 653, 671–72 (1935); Stuckey, supra note 4, at 668. 
6 See Frank, supra note 5, at 911–12; Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 673; Karl N. Llewellyn, 
The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. Legal Educ. 211, 212 (1948); see also Jerome 
Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 Yale L.J. 1303, 1321–22, 1327 (1947). 
7 See Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teach-
ing, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: Historical Development and 
Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal Education in the United States with 
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 One readily apparent response to this consensus of opinion would 
be for law schools to introduce students to clients as a formal and ex-
plicit component of their legal education curriculum. During the first 
half of the twentieth century, few law schools included any form of ex-
periential, practice-based education.8 The earliest emerging phenome-
non of law school clinics developed in the 1960s and 1970s from a mix 
of pedagogical and political commitments, with important seed fund-
ing from the Ford Foundation and its Council on Legal Education and 
Professional Responsibility.9 The teachers within the “second wave” of 
clinical education tended to have some connection to legal services and 
legal aid practice or criminal defense, and saw their role as activists as 
much as law professors.10 Over time, the role of experiential education 
within law schools evolved in important ways. While the emphasis on 
activism and social justice remained strong, the teachers and clinical 
supervisors developed more sophisticated clinical teaching methodol-
ogy and pedagogy.11 Law schools accepted clinical courses more and 
more as legitimate educational vehicles, granting students credit for 
their participation and offering clinical teachers improved status within 
the institution.12 
 Those trends, identified by Margaret Martin Barry, Jon Dubin, and 
Peter Joy as constituting the second wave in clinical education, have 
continued apace through 2012, as schools now have entered what those 
                                                                                                                      
Some Accounts of Conditions in England and Canada 281 (2d ed. 1986); Section of 
Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Am. Bar Ass’n, Legal Education and Profes-
sional Development—An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on 
Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 236–38 (1992) [hereinafter 
MacCrate Report]; Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vi-
sion and a Roadmap 167 (2007); William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: 
Preparation for the Profession of Law 87–88 (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report]; 
Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 57, 69–71 (2009). 
8 Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 
Clinical L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (2000) (stating that, in 1951, twenty-eight schools offered some 
form of clinical experience, but only ten schools awarded credit for students who partici-
pated). 
9 Id. at 18–19. 
10 See Frank Askin, A Law School Where Students Don’t Just Learn the Law, They Help Make 
the Law, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 855, 856 (1999); Barry et al., supra note 8, at 12; Marc 
Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 Geo. L.J. 1529, 1603–04 (1995); Wil-
liam Pincus, The Clinical Component in University Professional Education, 32 Ohio St. L.J. 283, 
285–86 (1971); William Pincus, Programs to Supplement Law Offices for the Poor, 41 Notre 
Dame Law. 887, 894–96 (1966). 
11 Barry et al., supra note 8, at 16–18; see also Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-
House Clinic, 42 J. Legal Educ. 508, 511 (1992) [hereinafter Future of the In-House Clinic] 
(“Clinical education is first and foremost a method of teaching.”). 
12 Barry et al., supra note 8, at 10–12. 
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observers describe as the clinical movement’s “third wave.”13 Every law 
school in the country offers some significant experiential education 
courses to its students, and most schools offer many robust opportuni-
ties.14 Likewise, more and more law schools offer clinical professors 
status equivalent to other law school faculty, including many schools 
with a “unified” tenure arrangement.15 
 Within the third wave of experiential and clinical education, many 
important challenges and uncertainties remain for law schools, espe-
cially in light of changes in the legal job market brought on by eco-
nomic forces and social, cultural, global, and technological develop-
ments. Among the most critical and stubborn of those challenges and 
uncertainties are questions of pedagogy, social justice, and cost. The peda-
gogy questions are central to the primary mission of law schools. If Best 
Practices for Legal Education and the Reed, MacCrate, and Carnegie reports 
are sound, how should law schools provide the most effective form of 
experiential and traditional education to their students, thereby maxi-
mizing educational development? Does exposure to any lawyering ex-
perience—including pro bono volunteer stints, academic year intern-
ships, summer jobs, externships, and in-house clinics—serve the neces-
sary purpose? If not, what factors matter in transforming a felt 
experience into an effective learning and discernment opportunity? 
 The pedagogical questions and challenges connect directly to the 
role of social justice and caring for the disadvantaged. If one accepts 
the proposition that students will learn best when assuming the profes-
sional role of lawyers by representing clients engaged in actual disputes 
or transactions, it makes sense—at least initially—that the clients whom 
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. at 4, 12; Future of the In-House Clinic, supra note 11, at 518. 
14 Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, Lawyering in the Academy: The Intersection of Academic 
Freedom and Professional Responsibility, 59 J. Legal Educ. 97, 98 (2009) (citations omitted) 
(“Today, the American Bar Association (ABA) requires every accredited law school to offer 
substantial opportunities in live-client or other real-life practice experiences. As a result, 
there are law clinics in almost every law school, with the AALS Directory of Law Teachers list-
ing nearly 1400 full-time faculty teaching clinical courses.”). 
15 Standards & Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, § 405(c) 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/ 
legal_education/Standards/2011_2012_aba_standards_chapter4.authcheckdam.pdf (“A 
law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security of position 
reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory perquisites reasonably similar to 
those provided other full-time faculty members.”). Many schools offer a “tenure equiva-
lent” status for clinical teachers and other full-time faculty employed on long-term con-
tracts, but more schools are instituting a unified tenure track. See Nina W. Tarr, In Support 
of a Unitary Tenure System for Law Faculty: An Essay, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 57, 58–59 
(2003) (arguing for a uniform tenure track for all law faculty, as yet unrealized at the time 
Tarr wrote her piece). 
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the students assist ought to be those who cannot afford counsel else-
where but face serious legal exposure. Representing disadvantaged cli-
ents intrinsically surfaces essential questions of systemic power and 
fairness. Access to justice therefore serves as a natural, and one might 
say serendipitous, accompaniment to the educational agenda. But that 
facile observation masks more complicated questions. Students may 
learn, and wish to learn, methods of practice and substantive law unre-
lated to the kinds of legal matters faced by low-income clients. Most 
observers would seemingly agree that some forms of legal practice, and 
some client matters, do not directly implicate serious questions of social 
justice or address access to justice needs. Should law school policies 
prevent students from learning effective lawyering in those settings? 
 And then there is the question of cost. Because it is true that one 
professor may (and some professors do) teach one hundred or more 
students in a classroom but one clinical professor could not possibly 
teach and supervise one hundred students as they actively represent 
clients in a clinic setting, the conventional wisdom concludes that ex-
periential education is expensive, more expensive than other forms of 
legal teaching. That conventional wisdom, even if true (and, perhaps, 
on further investigation it may be less true than typically assumed), 
begs a number of questions, including how costs compare within the 
academy and how to account for the value of teaching and learning in 
the varied segments of the law school curriculum. 
 These questions, and others related to them, are important, inter-
esting, and hard. They are also persistent. Because of all of those quali-
ties, we conceived of the idea of bringing together for a day a group of 
experienced and thoughtful thinkers and writers to do their best to sort 
out the competing considerations. The result was this Symposium, 
named (by our colleague Alan Minuskin) The Way to Carnegie: Practice, 
Practice, Practice: A Conversation About Pedagogy, Social Justice, and Cost in 
Experiential Legal Education, and held on October 28, 2012, at Boston 
College Law School. 
 The Symposium consisted (after an event the evening before for 
panelists, faculty, and students) of three panels, each addressing one of 
the topics described above. The first panel addressed the issue of peda-
gogy. Moderated by Alan Minuskin,16 the first panel included Margaret 
                                                                                                                      
16 Associate Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. 
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Martin Barry,17 Phyllis Goldfarb,18 Rebecca Sandefur,19 and Karen To-
karz.20 The next panel addressed the role of social justice within expe-
riential education. Moderated by Francine Sherman,21 the second 
panel included Jane Aiken,22 Praveen Kosuri,23 Michael Pinard,24 and 
Stephen Wizner.25 A third and final panel addressed the critical ques-
tions of cost and implementation. Moderated by Alexis Anderson,26 the 
final panel consisted of Muneer Ahmad,27 Peter Joy,28 and Richard 
Neumann.29 Because Peter Joy encountered a last-minute complication 
preventing him from attending the event, Russell Engler30 presented 
Peter Joy’s ideas, as well as many of his own, as part of this panel. 
 In the middle of the Symposium, the participants heard a keynote 
address from Larry Kramer, then Dean of Stanford Law School.31 Dean 
Kramer, who has had a notable career as a doctrinal classroom teacher 
and scholar in the areas of constitutional law, federalism, and civil pro-
cedure,32 described the emphasis that Stanford Law School placed on 
                                                                                                                      
17 Professor, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law; Visiting 
Professor of Law and Acting Associate Dean for Clinical and Experiential Programs, Ver-
mont Law School. 
18 Jacob Burns Foundation Professor of Clinical Law and Associate Dean for Clinical 
Affairs, The George Washington University Law School. 
19 Senior Research Social Scientist, American Bar Foundation; Assistant Professor of 
Sociology, Stanford University. 
20 Charles Nagel Professor of Public Interest Law & Public Service, Director of the Ne-
gotiation and Dispute Resolution Program, and Director of the Civil Rights, Community 
Justice & Mediation Clinic, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. 
21 Visiting Professor and Director of the Juvenile Rights Advocacy Project, Boston Col-
lege Law School. 
22 Professor of Law and Director of the Community Justice Project, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. 
23 Practice Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
24 Professor of Law and Director of the Clinical Law Program, University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law. 
25 William O. Douglas Clinical Professor Emeritus of Law, Supervising Attorney, and 
Professorial Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. 
26 Associate Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. 
27 Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
28 Vice Dean and Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. 
Louis School of Law. 
29 Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. 
30 Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, New England School of Law. 
31 Larry Kramer, Dean, Stanford Law School, Keynote Address at the Boston College 
Journal of Law & Social Justice Symposium: The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice, Prac-
tice—Pedagogy, Social Justice, and Cost in Experiential Legal Education (Oct. 28, 2011), 
available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/newsevents/events/conferences/carnegie_ 
symp_twlj/carnegie_video.html. 
32 See Larry Kramer, Stanford L. Sch., http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/pro- 
file/37 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
2012] Foreword: The Way to Carnegie 221 
experiential—and particularly clinical—legal education, including ex-
panding its curriculum and faculty and moving to integrate its clinical 
faculty more seamlessly with classroom faculty. Dean Kramer shared his 
ideas about each of the topics addressed at the Symposium, both dur-
ing his keynote address and during the discussion segments of each 
panel. 
 The Symposium was a great success. In addition to a day of rich 
and spirited conversation about clinical education, the Symposium 
produced six compelling papers, described below. 
I. Questions of Pedagogy 
 If law schools aim to graduate lawyers who are “practice ready,” 
what does practice ready mean and what pedagogical methods will be 
most effective in achieving that goal? All six symposium papers offer 
insights on these questions. The two papers focusing primarily on cur-
riculum—authored by Deans of Clinical Education at their respective 
law schools—both recommend more clinical and experiential educa-
tion better integrated within the law school curriculum. 
 In Back to the Future of Clinical Legal Education, Phyllis Goldfarb 
warns that the current law school model, which costs too much and 
delivers too little, is economically and educationally unsustainable.33 
For law schools to survive, thrive, and strive to meet society’s legal 
needs, Goldfarb believes legal educators must reconceive the relation-
ship between law schools’ dual identities as academic institutions and 
professional schools and create an integrated curriculum in which con-
textual educational methods play a larger and more central role. Clini-
cal methods rooted in particular yet generalizable contexts, Goldfarb 
contends, are the most promising means law schools have for confront-
ing future challenges and realizing their potential as schools of both 
academic and professional instruction. 
 Goldfarb explains that the schizophrenic separation of academic 
legal analysis and professional skills and values makes no sense in the 
law school of the future. Lawyers’ work is complex and requires inte-
gration of these components. When the educational enterprise is func-
tioning at its best, the intellectual and practical are tightly intertwined 
and mutually reinforcing. Law students need—and society needs law 
students to get—educational opportunities that are three-dimensional, 
where they use the knowledge they acquire and become attentive, not 
                                                                                                                      
33 Phyllis Goldfarb, Back to the Future of Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 
279 (2012). 
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only to what they are getting, but to the kind of professionals they are 
becoming. 
 Drawing on recommendations and findings of the MacCrate and 
Carnegie Reports and on Professors Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon 
Zedeck’s empirical research on skills vital to the art of lawyering, Gold-
farb argues that clinical legal education is the most promising means 
available for cultivating the competencies that future lawyers need.34 
Legal analysis, research, and writing will continue to be important, but 
the contextual pedagogy of skills, values, and professional identity in 
service to others offered only in clinics will enable law school gradu-
ates—and law schools—to thrive and make a positive contribution to 
society. 
 Goldfarb concedes that clinical education is expensive—especially 
compared to the mass education of the traditional case method—and 
that expanding clinical offerings may require law schools to reduce 
something else, but she warns that the social and economic costs of do-
ing nothing are far greater. The same economic forces bearing down 
on law schools have only increased society’s need for reflective, ethical, 
and skilled lawyers. Redeploying resources toward clinical education 
may enable clinical educators to teach more students more efficiently. 
By the same token, if clinics become more central in the law school 
curriculum, clinicians must maximize their educational value by teach-
ing habits, skills, and values that will serve students in whatever profes-
sional opportunities they pursue. 
 The call for a revamped, integrated law school curriculum with 
experiential education at its core is also the theme of Margaret Martin 
Barry’s Article, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet? 35 In this symposium con-
tribution, Barry answers her subtitle’s question in the negative. To 
move the project forward, she proposes a model law school curriculum, 
which she hopes will help build consensus among legal educators on 
how best to prepare students for the legal profession. 
 Beginning with the proposition that “practice ready” must mean 
more than the ability to perform legal analysis, Barry contends it must 
also include a “grounding in how the law is developed, interpreted, cri-
tiqued, accessed, and used to work toward expertise, whether inde-
                                                                                                                      
34 Carnegie Report, supra note 7, at 87–88; MacCrate Report, supra note 7, at 236–
38; Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Final Report: Identification, Develop-
ment, and Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering 26–27 (2008), available 
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/LSACREPORTfinal-12.pdf. 
35 Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet?, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 247 
(2012). 
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pendently or with the benefit of organizational support.”36 Barry points 
out that, despite almost a century of critique of the traditional case 
method and multiple calls for reform, law schools have been reluctant 
to assess—let alone redesign—their curriculum. While most law schools 
offer clinical and other experiential offerings in the second and third 
years and some have diversified their first year curriculum by adding 
electives and practice-oriented offerings, Barry complains that there 
has been little reflection on how these pieces fit together and relate to 
the overall educational enterprise.37 To advance the conversation, 
Barry proposes a curricular framework for modern legal education 
which incorporates clinical and experiential education into an overall 
program designed to build the knowledge, skills, and values lawyers 
need to enter the profession. 
 Barry recommends that law schools begin with a “common portal 
to legal education,” emphasizing legal doctrine and theory but con-
necting them to people, communities, and values.38 She would main-
tain basic doctrinal courses but infuse them with factual context, prob-
lem solving, ethics, and professionalism. In the second year, Barry rec-
ommends more active techniques such as simulations and role plays to 
teach additional skills, even in large classes.39 Barry would devote the 
final year of law school to experiential education, allowing students to 
deploy knowledge, skills, and competencies learned in the previous two 
years while practicing on real cases in a law school clinic, externship, or 
a hybrid of the two. Barry recognizes that dedicating one-third of the 
law school curriculum to experiential education will require a significa-
tion reallocation of law school resources, and she urges legal educators 
to be creative in developing carefully supervised experiential opportu-
nities. Law schools, she proffers, might consider creating their own fee-
generating law firms if they can do so consistent with their pedagogical 
and social justice missions. 
                                                                                                                      
36 Id. at 250. 
37 Id. at 263. Barry discusses Stanford Law School as an example of a leading school 
that has revamped its second and third year curricula to include more clinical and experi-
ential options, as CUNY School of Law, Dave Clark School of Law, and the University of 
New Mexico School of Law did before it. She also outlines the first year program reform at 
Boston College Law School, Cardozo Law School, Harvard Law School, Washington & Lee 
University School of Law, and the University of California Irvine School of Law. Id. at 256–
60. 
38 Id. at 267, 270–71. 
39 Id. at 270–71. Barry points to the General Practice Program at Vermont Law School 
as an example of this approach. Id. 
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II. Questions of Social Justice 
 Law school clinics arose from and were inspired by the civil rights 
and social justice movements of the 1960s and early 1970s. Over the 
past five decades, the clinical teaching method and social justice mis-
sions of clinical legal education have gone hand in hand, with law 
school clinics providing students opportunities to develop skills and 
values by representing the poor and politically disempowered. Indeed, 
all of the articles in this Symposium comment in one way or another on 
the pedagogical, social, and economic value of the social justice mission 
of clinical legal education. As the unique educational and career bene-
fits of clinical legal education have become more widely appreciated, 
however, a diversity of law school clinics have emerged, not all of which 
serve the poor or promote progressive legal reform. Law students are 
interested in transactional, legislative, and Supreme Court clinics in 
addition to traditional, community-based clinics providing direct legal 
services to the poor. These developments raise questions about the con-
tinuing relevance of the social justice mission in clinical legal educa-
tion: Is clinical legal education a neutral teaching methodology or does 
it (or should it) have a substantive social justice mission as well? Is 
teaching students to pursue social justice merely an option for clinics, 
or is it a moral imperative? A trio of articles by Stephen Wizner, Jane 
Aiken, and Praveen Kosuri delve deeply into the question of the rela-
tionship between clinical legal education and social justice. 
 In a narrative so appropriate for a symposium on experiential 
learning, Stephen Wizner describes his personal journey from neighbo-
rhood legal services lawyer to Yale professor, and in the process he ar-
ticulates a timeless vision of the social justice mission of clinical legal 
education. His Article, Is Social Justice Still Relevant?, recounts how the 
first clinics arose in response to student demand for curricular reform 
driven by the social activism of the times.40 Wizner and the Yale students 
who inspired him to start a clinic there—including Boston College Law 
School’s former Dean Avi Soifer—believed that lawyers, law schools, and 
law students could and should use the law to pursue progressive social 
change. Wizner and the other founders of the clinical legal education 
movement did not see it as mere skills training but rather as a way to 
involve future lawyers in the “struggle for social justice in America.”41 
 Wizner contends that the social justice mission that inspired the 
creation of the first law school clinics should and indeed does continue 
                                                                                                                      
40 Stephen Wizner, Is Social Justice Still Relevant?, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 345 (2012). 
41 Id. at 347. 
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to be a central focus of clinical legal education. The methodology of clini-
cal legal education includes professional skills training through the su-
pervised provision of legal services to clients, but the goal is more ambi-
tious. The goal includes, among other things, inculcating in students 
an understanding of and concern for the circumstances of those who 
live in poverty or otherwise lack access to legal services, and a feeling of 
professional responsibility for increasing their access to justice. One 
should not seek to extract the clinical methodology from this mission, 
Wizner contends, because giving law students the opportunity to rec-
ognize their power and responsibility to democratize the legal system 
and to pursue justice is an important part of what the methodology of 
clinical legal education is for. 
 Wizner does not see the development of new and innovative ap-
proaches to clinical legal education as inconsistent with a continued 
focus on social justice. As a descriptive matter, he points out that a so-
cial justice mission continues to inform and drive the majority of clini-
cal program design, teaching, and student learning. He acknowledges 
the emergence of clinics that do not fit the direct legal services para-
digm but suggests that these new types of clinics should also focus on 
helping low income and other under-represented clients, even if indi-
rectly. Transactional clinics should assist small businesses and nonprofit 
community organizations. Environmental clinics should defend low-
income populations from pollution and other environmental threats. 
Whatever the context, Wizner explains, when clinics focus their work 
on providing legal services to or on behalf of low income clients, stu-
dents can experience the professional and personal satisfaction of mak-
ing a difference in their lives. Law schools need not choose between 
clinical educational diversity and social justice because the two can and 
should continue hand in hand. 
 Wizner believes that while law schools may not be able to recap-
ture the spirit of the social activism of the 1960s, the social justice mis-
sion of clinics should continue to inform everything clinicians do, from 
designing clinics to client and case selection to supervision and teach-
ing. He urges clinical professors to continue to ask what knowledge and 
values we are inculcating in our students and how we are equipping 
them to address needs in the broader community, particularly of those 
who cannot afford to pay for legal services. 
 Jane Aiken takes up this challenge in The Clinical Mission of Justice 
Readiness, where she looks to transformative learning theory to inform 
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how law schools can best prepare students to pursue social justice.42 
Aiken contends that, because everything lawyers do has some relevance 
to justice or injustice, ignoring or reinforcing injustices in the legal sys-
tem—as traditional law school classes tend to do—teaches students to 
respect the status quo and to think they have little or no power or re-
sponsibility for ensuring substantive justice. To avoid perpetuating in-
justice, law schools must do more than help students become ready to 
join an unjust system; they have a responsibility to teach their students 
to recognize injustice and fight against it in their legal careers. Aiken 
warns that the clinical legal education debate must therefore shift from 
whether clinicians should be in the justice business at all to which 
methods are most effective in teaching justice readiness. 
 Aiken believes that virtue, like proficiency in legal analysis and ad-
vocacy, can be taught, and is best taught in clinics where the justice di-
mension is discovered by the students themselves through experience 
and reflection. Drawing support from transformative learning theory, 
Aiken argues that the clinical experience, with properly chosen cases or 
projects, supervision, and guided reflection, allows student to experi-
ence the kind of “disorientation” and “reorientation” that can trans-
form their thinking about the legal system and their responsibility to 
pursue justice in their professional lives. 
 Aiken argues that well-designed law school clinics are great labora-
tories for transformative learning because they are full of disorienting 
dilemmas, including the shock of responsibility for real cases and the 
emotional turmoil of caring about real clients. While learning theory 
suggests that the affective experience students gain in clinics may be 
transformative in and of itself, Aiken believes that combining disorient-
ing experiences with restorative learning methods can move students 
beyond individual understanding to social responsibility and action.43 
In addition to choosing cases and projects most likely to stimulate trans-
formative emotions and insights, Aiken urges clinicians to use research 
on transformative learning to develop teaching methods designed to 
help students mine their experiences and reflect upon them critically. 
Transformative learning theory, she suggests, may also provide a basis 
for comparing the relative efficacy of teaching methods and for en-
                                                                                                                      
42 Jane H. Aiken, The Clinical Mission of Justice Readiness, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 231 
(2012). 
43 Id. at 243–44. Aiken relies here on research by Elizabeth Lange. Elizabeth A. Lange, 
Transformative and Restorative Learning: A Vital Dialectic for Sustainable Societies, 54 Adult 
Educ. Q. 121, 137 (2004). 
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couraging law schools to offer students more transformative experien-
tial learning opportunities. 
 Wizner and Aiken articulate and defend a vision for accomplishing 
social justice goals within a law school’s experiential learning opportu-
nities, and most notably through its clinical programs, but Praveen Ko-
suri offers a different perspective. Kosuri’s contribution to this Sympo-
sium, Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, questions whether law school clinics ought to pursue a social 
justice mission.44 Kosuri is quick to note that he is not opposed to social 
justice; instead, his argument is that insisting on a social justice focus 
within law school clinics narrows the clinical opportunities available for 
a wide array of students and sacrifices some pedagogical aims. 
 Kosuri invokes the image of Martin Luther and The Reformation 
in his critique of the establishment perspective in clinical education 
and offers his own theses, much as Luther did in 1517. Kosuri’s argu-
ment is elegant, describing clinical legal education as law school’s “pin-
nacle” pedagogical experience but lamenting the exclusive province of 
an elite and self-selected group of teachers with uniform ideologies and 
commitments, all tending toward a shared (but narrow) conception of 
social justice in clinics. Those clinical teachers offer to students practice 
opportunities limited to those which replicate the social justice values 
owned by the clinicians and their “Great Clinician” progeny. The result, 
Kosuri notes, is that “the Great Clinicians defined social justice,” and 
“to be a good clinician meant believing in the Great Clinicians’ concept 
of social justice and inculcating students with that belief.”45 
 In Kosuri’s view, the clinics’ homogeneous dedication to a vision of 
social justice ignores or excludes those students who do not share that 
vision or simply wish to participate in clinics covering practice and sub-
stantive law settings that happen not to include a social justice compo-
nent. A diminished, or less dogmatic, focus on social justice would lead 
to an expansion of the kinds of clinical opportunities available to stu-
dents and a more efficient delivery of the best kind of legal education. 
 Kosuri acknowledges the risks he takes by presenting his theses, 
both through the possible implication to readers that he is not a fan of 
social justice (not so), and through his defending a position not em-
braced by many of his clinical teacher peers (much more likely).46 He is 
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32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 331 (2012). 
45 Id. at 333. 
46 Id. at 343; see also Praveen Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D—Maximizing Impact Through Trans-
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provocative in arguing that professors committed to social justice incul-
cate in their students their own values, and that schools ought to attend 
to the difference between “non-social justice clinics and social justice 
ones.”47 Interestingly, Wizner uses the same theme of inculcation in his 
contribution to this Symposium. While Kosuri seems to worry about in-
culcation as an imposition of one’s personal values on another, Wizner 
appears to view that process as teaching and encouraging students to 
care about what a commonly shared sense of justice requires. This ten-
sion raises important questions about whether social justice is an essen-
tial element of the legal training mission, appearing in all contexts, or 
whether it is particular to certain practice settings.48 
III. Questions of Cost and Implementation 
 The third panel of the Symposium addressed a topic critical to any 
discussion of experiential legal education, and especially clinical legal 
education—the allocation of resources necessary to offer students a 
meaningful practice experience in law school. The topics of cost and 
implementation appeared in other contributors’ work as well, but this 
panel addressed the questions most directly.49 Conventional wisdom 
says that, even if it is the most effective method of teaching productive 
and thoughtful lawyering, clinical legal education—along with many 
other forms of experiential teaching—is just too expensive to offer to a 
majority of law students. With law school expenses (and the accompa-
nying student debt) rising steadily, conventional wisdom places on insti-
tutions a fiduciary responsibility to their students to diminish, rather 
than increase, these expensive teaching vehicles.50 At a minimum, ob-
servers note, one needs an effective and rigorous cost-benefit analysis 
before supporting a greater role for experiential learning opportunities 
for students. 
 The third Symposium panel addressed those concerns directly. In 
this issue, Peter Joy, vice dean and professor of law at Washington Uni-
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versity in St. Louis School of Law, offers an assessment that acknowl-
edges these challenges but defies much conventional wisdom. In his 
Symposium Article, The Cost of Clinical Education, Joy argues that ob-
servers are asking the wrong questions when they complain viscerally 
about the cost of clinics.51 The correct questions, he tells us, relate to 
the goals of legal education as an endeavor, the reasons behind law 
school cost increases, the nature of law school expenses, and the effec-
tiveness of teaching methods. The central thrust of his argument is that 
law schools spend a great deal of money on many things, several of 
which do not contribute significantly—or as significantly—to the cen-
tral mission of training competent, ethical, and discerning lawyers. 
 Joy reports on studies showing that the escalating costs of legal 
education relate more reliably to the “market for prestige” than to the 
actual necessary costs of running an institution.52 And the costs that 
students must bear, while quite serious, are not driven by experiential 
education programs. Joy’s research shows that “the most significant 
long-term driver of rising legal education costs are lower teaching loads 
and higher salaries for law faculty.”53 Far from contributing significantly 
to the cost acceleration of recent years, expenditures for clinical pro-
grams, according to Joy, actually have dropped as a percentage of law 
school budgets, as other costs, including faculty salaries and building 
projects, have increased dramatically.54 
 Joy also explores the delicate comparison of the production cost of 
faculty scholarship compared to the costs of effective teaching of stu-
dents through experiential methods. While experiential education surely 
calls for some concentrated dedication of resources—mostly in teacher 
time but also in law practice facilities—the direct cost to the school of 
producing a publishable law review article can exceed $100,000.55 Rigor-
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ous and elegant scholarship serves many important purposes within the 
academy, as does effective teaching and mentoring of students. Joy’s 
point is that a good faith inquiry about the costs and benefits of law 
school spending on clinical teaching must be a principled one, including 
in its scope a wider swath of the academy’s activities than the expense of 
practice-based learning alone. 
 Joy’s contribution to the Symposium is an essential one. The first 
two panels grappled openly and compassionately with the pedagogical 
values of differing teaching methods and with the role of social justice 
within law schools, whether through clinics or otherwise. Those inquir-
ies and debates alone, however, can easily be discounted if experiential 
education is simply too costly to implement, its benefits notwithstand-
ing. Joy’s Article introduces—but only begins—a more honest assess-
ment of the relative costs of experiential and clinical education when 
assessed in light of competing expenditures in the institution and the 
benefits of those programs. As Joy reminds us at the end of his Article, 
“The longer law faculties delay addressing these issues, the more diffi-
cult the conversations and choices will become.”56 
Conclusion 
 The 2007 Carnegie Report reminded law schools of their fiduciary 
responsibility to take practice more seriously. The authors contributing 
to this Symposium have offered insightful and creative ideas to assist 
the academy in its effort to make legal education more relevant, effec-
tive, and just. We thank them and their colleagues who participated on 
the panels for their generosity of spirit, their kindness, and their com-
mitment to the cause of clinical legal education. 
 We also express our deepest, heartfelt thanks to the staff of the Bos-
ton College Journal of Law & Social Justice who worked so hard and so effi-
ciently to make this Symposium happen and to make it such a success. 
 
56 Joy, supra note 51, at 330. 
